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JUDICIAL MODESTY, POLITICAL REALITY, AND
PREFERRED POSITION*
Martin Skapirot
INTRODUCTION
Since its traumatic experiences of the thirties, the Supreme Court of

the United States has been faced with two great problems to which it has
not yet found adequate solutions. The first is the difficult task of defining
its role in modern American government. The other has been the more
substantive problem of dealing with a kind of case which is, if not new,
at least newly injected with popular emotion and international significance. The "subversion" cases, often involving first amendment questions, have certainly led to more backing and filling and more clearly
expressed judicial anguish than any others recently before the Court.
The two areas are, of course, closely interrelated. In spite of the recent
demonstration by the Warren Court of the possibilities of marginal
adjustments through statutory construction in civil liberties cases,1 the
extent to which the Justices are willing to protect the speech and other
liberties of alleged "subversives" must largely depend on their own
conceptions of the general powers and responsibilities which the Supreme
Court may properly exercise. Put another way, both of the Supreme
Court's great problems are basically political, not legal. They are not so
much questions of statutory or narrowly constitutional interpretation as
disputes over the power of one segment of a government vis-A-vis other
segments of that government and the public.
Granted the American tradition of discussing such questions of political
power and influence in legal or pseudo-legal terms, it would nevertheless
seem profitable to look at politics from the point of view of politics. This
article attempts to combine what we know of the politics of American
national government with what we have so often heard of the legal and
constitutional debate in order to shed some further light on the problem
of judicial modesty particularly as it relates to freedom of speech.
THE GREAT DEBATE

We begin with the great debate over modesty itself. Fortunately, that
debate has recently inspired two clear statements by leading members
of the opposing schools, the late Judge Learned Hand and Professor
Charles Black of the Yale Law School.'
* The research for this article was done under a grant from the Samuel Fels Foundation
of Philadelphia.
t See contributor's section, masthead p. 248, for biographical data.
1 See Hand, The Bill of Rights 73 (1958).
2 Hand, supra note 1; Black, The People And The Court (1960).
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Judge Hand finds in his Constitution a system of separate and coequal
departments, each a "Leibnizian monad." Judicial review, which breaches
the walls of separation, is contrary to the whole design of the document,3
which omits any specific authorization for review.4 The supremacy clause,
while admittedly allowing a measure of supervision over state acts, is
so limited and specific that it undermines rather than supports the claim
to a general power of review., The analogy frequently drawn between
the necessity for judicial assessment of a supposed conflict between two
statutes and the alleged power of the Supreme Court to examine conflicts
between the Constitution and a Congressional enactment is improper.
In the former instance, the conflict is merely between an earlier and a
later legislative judgment. Since the legislature is not bound by its own
previous judgments, a judicial finding of conflict merely implements the
later will of the legislature." It might be added, although Hand does not
say so here, that the legislature in this situation, is perfectly free to
reinstruct the courts by new legislation if it feels that the judges were in
error. However, when the Supreme Court invalidates a statute, it
perforce substitutes its choice among competing values for that of the
legislature. 7 This usurpation will inevitably result in the general recognition that judges inject their own judicial predilections into law. That
knowledge will destroy the principal source of judicial prestige, for the
real judicial sanction is the notion that the courts enunciate the will of
the public not the sentiments of the judges.8
But Hand's objection to judicial interference with legislative decision
does not rest primarily on a judge's self-interest in preserving the judicial
myth. It is derived instead from his basic conception of the Constitution
and American democracy. The Constitution neither embodies natural
law in the sense of an emanation from the Divine Will nor consists of
substantive instruction as to the ends of governmental activity. In other
words it is not a code of abstract rights and wrongs, but simply a
blueprint for the distribution of the people's political power among the
several departments of government. Since this plan confides the deternuination of the substance of governmental policy to the Congress and the
President, the only possible role for the Court is to determine whether
these departments are operating within the confines established by the
blueprint. If the Court attempts to decide whether other departments
3

Hand,
Id. at
5 Id. at
6 Id. at
7 Id. at
8 Id. at
4

supra note 1, at 4, 10-11 (1958).
10-11.
5,28.
28-29.
37-39.
71-72.
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are "right," a judicial oligarchy "unaccountable to anyone but itself"
usurps the task of the "popular assembly" and thus, violates "the underlying presuppositions of popular government.""
Professor Black's reply to this plea for self-restraint is primarily based
on a simple line of logic. The Constitution is law. Courts apply and
interpret law. Therefore, courts apply and interpret the Constitution."
article III defines the jurisdiction of the Court in terms of cases arising
under the Constitution. Therefore, when a statute conflicts with the
Constitution, the Supreme Court must decide between the two laws. It
cannot avoid the issue, for refusal to look to the Constitution in fact
decides the case in favor of the statute and against the Constitution."
As to the legal nature of the Constitution, Black argues that the
Constitution looks like law (it has a preamble, etc.), states that it is law
(article VI), was thought by the founders to be law (FEDERALIST
PAPERS), and has been considered law ever since.'"
In short, although disagreeing with Chief Justice Marshall on particulars, 13 Professor Black finds that Marbury v. Madison 4 reflected
both the views of the framers and the sentiment of the times, as well as
the natural conclusion to be drawn from the concept of constitutional
democracy. The people desired to limit themselves and chose judicial
review as a practical means to that end,' 5 and the historical evolution and
acceptance of review indicate popular confirmation of the original choice." 6
Therefore, according to Black, those who oppose review are both illogical
and immodest-illogical in seeking to upset the choice of the people
in the name of popular sovereignty and immodest in wishing to effect a
major alteration in the basic framework of our government through the
judicial processY.
So far as Black is concerned, they wish to do so for insufficient reasons.
Their principal fear is that judicial review is undemocratic and allows
excessive judicial policy-making. But it is widely known that judges are
compelled to make policy decisions in all areas of law. The fact that
they do so in the field of constitutional law is, therefore, neither unusual
nor prejudicial to their continued prestige.'" Nor is review undemocratic.
Many appointive officials make important decisions in our governmental
9 Id. at 3-4, 73-4.
10 Black, supra note 2, at 6, 14-15, 115 (1960).
11 Id. at 8.
12 Id. at 7.
13 Id. at 26-27.
14 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
15 Black, supra note 2, at 106, 115.
16 Id. at 7, 105.
17 Id. at 101, 105, 107-08.
18 Id., Ch. VI passim.
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process. Popular control of the judiciary is accomplished through public
opinion, the amending process, and the powers of Congress over the
Court's jurisdiction and enforcement machinery.19
There are of course internal difficulties with the positions of both
contestants. Certainly, Hand is guilty at the very least of overemphasis
when he speaks of Leibnizian monads. It is hardly necessary to cite
authorities for the proposition that the relations between the three
branches of the federal government have involved a considerable degree
of overlapping. The phrase, "checks and balances," serves to remind us
that this was precisely the framers' intention. Indeed, Judge Hand seems
to assign the Court one of the most difficult possible functions when he
asks it to set out the boundaries between the various spheres of governmental authority. One can hardly imagine an area more fraught with
judicial policy-making than that of jurisdictional surveyor in a governmental system which tends to translate most of its policy questions into
disputes over operational boundary lines.
Professor Black attempts to disarm his critics in advance by admitting
that his argument is not logically infallible. Nevertheless, his basic
argument-the Constitution is law, courts deal with law, therefore the
Supreme Court must look to the Constitution-rests on logic. If his
rivals poke holes in his logic, he turns to history to demonstrate that his
argument has been proved by experience. However, when it becomes
apparent that the historical picture is not entirely clear, he reverts to his
logical argument as a guide to the most reasonable interpretation of
history. The point is that Black's conclusion is neither logical nor
empirical, but simply verbal.
All in all, when following the struggles of the champions of modesty
and activism, one gets the curious impression that for all the blows and
counterblows there is really no solid contact, and this impression persists
largely because the modest seem to have no very firm position so that
they roll easily with the punch but cannot deliver a knockout blow
themselves. In fact, the modest seem to have no more than a set of
problems and hesitations which mark a dilemma rather than a solution
to the problem of judicial activity.
The problems begin at the beginning, with the Constitution itself.
The Constitution must in some way be a law. As Black points out, it
even says it is. But a document which paints in such broad strokes is
obviously not law in the same sense as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Nor is it just a law in the sense that a later lawmaker may
19 Id. at 178-82, 209.
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modify or replace the work of an earlier. Its elaborate amending
provisions and its extraordinary origin in a series of ad hoc representative
bodies set it apart from most law. Thus, the American Constitution is not
so lawlike in terms of detail and precision that it can automatically and
naturally be applied by the courts as they do the bankruptcy statutes;
but, at the same time it is not so imprecise that the courts can in good
conscience ignore it in the face of subsequent Congressional legislation
which seems to contravene its provisions.
Other clues from the nature of the Constitution are available. Its
appeal to and obvious derivation from the theory of popular sovereignty
have led to the suggestion that it was conceived of as a law emanating
directly from the people. It would thus displace the sovereignty of the
ordinary legislative bodies and subject them to the controlling popular
will as enunciated in the document.2 o The extensive research indicating
the higher or natural law content of the Constitution is too familiar to
require parading here again. 21 The difficulty is that the commanding
position of the Constitution, whether expressed in popular sovereignty or
natural law terms, does not necessarily demonstrate the validity of review. Indeed, this very conception of the Constitution suggests that enforcement by all branches of the government and/or directly by the
people through their right of revolution would be more appropriate than
the rather narrow and technical enforcement available through the courts.
However, when such eminently modest judges as Justice Jackson, Justice Frankfurter, and Judge Hand all conclude that review is logically
and realistically immanent in the notion of a written constitution,2 2 we
might expect finally to have arrived at some unquestionable support for
judicial review derived directly from the Consitution; but, alas it is the
activists who reject this argument, insisting that its writtenness is the
least important characteristic of our Constitution and has no connection
2

per se with review

3

Nor does the specific wording or the intentions of the drafters solve
the problem raised by the unique nature of the document taken as
a whole. Judge Hand was probably too cavalier in dismissing the
supremacy clause as looking more against than toward review,2 4 but his
20 Dumbauld, "Judicial Review and Popular Sovereignty," 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 197, 204
(1950).

21 See Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law (Great
Seal Books ed. 1955); Haines, The American Doctrine of judicial Supremacy (1959).
22 Hand, Spirit of Liberty 274, 277 (1952); Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 26 (1955); Frankfurter, "John Marshall and the Judicial
Function," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 219 (1955).
23 Dumbauld, supra note 20; Black, supra note 2, at 26.
24 Hand, supra note 1, at 28.
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tone of indecision seems properly chosen. However, Professor Wechsler, 25
seconded by Professor Black,2 6 has made a brave effort to derive review
from the supremacy clause. He argues that since the clause requires
state courts to decide the constitutionality of state statutes 27 and since
article III gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over all cases arising
under the Constitution, it was obviously intended to give the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over the state courts. If the Supreme Court
was to exercise such jurisdiction, it must have had the duty of examining
the same range of issues as the lower courts whose findings it was to
review. Thus, it must have been empowered to determine the constitutionality of statutes. Since the Constitution does not require the
creation of any inferior federal courts, all constitutional issues might
have arisen in the state courts so that the Supreme Court must have been
intended to review all such issues, and it could hardly have been the
purpose of the framers to give the Supreme Court less authority over the
lower federal courts than over the state courts. Therefore, the establishment of lower federal courts could not reduce the scope of the Court's
appellate jurisdiction.2"
This argument, while ingenious, hardly seems decisive. In the first
place the Constitution does not specifically give the Court appellate
jurisdiction over state proceedings. In fact, Wechsler must rely on the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and his argument may be turned on its head to
suggest that the Act of 1789 was itself unconstitutional, for how can a
court which has not specifically been given access to the Constitution
review the work of courts that have? But more fundamentally, the
problem is that the supremacy clause only concerns conflict between state
statutes and the federal constitution. Therefore, if Wechsler's argument
is given the fullest play, it can only prove that the Supreme Court was
intended to decide the constitutionality of state statutes. Given the
combination of a strong central government and the separation of powers
favored by many members of the Convention, this is not an unreasonable
conclusion. The presence or absence of lower federal courts is, of course,
irrelevant. Wechsler's argument that their absence would have thrown
all constitutional issues to the state courts, and thus to the Supreme
Court for review, merely assumes what is to be proven, that conflicts
between federal law and the federal constitution were conceived as proper
25 Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1959).
26 Black, supra note 2, at 6-7.

27 Judge Hand agrees that state courts were intended to decide the constitutionality
of state statutes. Hand, supra note 1, at 28.
28 Wechsler, supra note 25, at 2-5.
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issues for the courts, and certainly the creation of lower federal courts
could not give the Supreme Court any more power to declare federal
statutes unconstitutional than it originally had. The actual wording of
the Constitution thus leaves us exactly where we began, with a strong
suggestion of review but no clear-cut case.
The intentions of the framers have been so dissected and centrifuged
that it hardly seems worth while to perform the laboratory work again
here. Suffice it to say that no one has made out an absolutely clear case
for review on these grounds, but most authorities agree that some kind of
review was intended by some members of the Convention. In short,
the Constitution itself, the theory behind it, and the intention of the
framers all suggest some sort of judicial review, but are neither clear nor
decisive enough to comfort the modest.
If the modest experience some tension over the initial authorization for
review, they are even more disturbed by the problem of its compatibility
with the democratic system. As we shall see a little further on, much
of the trouble here stems from a rather naive view of democracy and
particularly of the democratic character of legislatures. Nevertheless,
Supreme Court Justices are not directly responsible to the people in the
sense that elected officials are, and quite obviously government by nine
specialists, appointed for life and at least theoretically insulated from the
political process, smacks of something other than democracy.
However, the nagging fear of the modest is less usurpation by the
Court than abdication by the people. Ever since Thayer set down the
original canon,30 the modest have cautioned that excessive activity by
the courts would reduce the responsibility of the people for their own
affairs and thus weaken democracy. Since the Congress constitutes the
people working out their own salvation through the political process,
the Supreme Court must leave it the widest possible responsibility. There
is a good deal more to say on this subject and we shall return to it
later. However, it must be admitted that reliance on the judicial process
to complete exclusion of the political process would greatly change our
29 Professor Crosskey, of course, has absolute and overwhelming proof that the Convention did not intend review. The trouble is that this evidence has not overwhelmed
most of the authorities who have considered it so that at most his researches add to the
ambiguity of the problem.
In general see Wagner, The Federal States and Their judiciary 88-90 (1959), and
authorities cited therein. Cf. Cahn, "The Doubter and the Bill of Rights," 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
903 (1955) with Mendelson, "Cahn on Jefferson, Commager and Learned Hand," 37 Tex.
L. Rev. 721 (1959). On Crosskey see his II Politics and the Constitution 982-85, 1006-07
and Hart, Book Review 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1456 (1954). Ketcham, "James Madison and
Judicial Review," 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 158 (1957) deals at length with the inconsistencies
in Madison's writings on review which have served as one of the principal bases for
Crosskey's thesis.
0 Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,"
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
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system of government. Therefore, this rationale of the modest contains
at least a kernel of truth.
Of course, the problem of the democratic nature of review is finally and
decisively affected by our first area of discussion, the nature and origin
of the Constitution itself. First of all, if any constitutional authorization
for review can be found, and there does seem to be some, then the courts
can hardly deny in the name of deference to the people a task bestowed
upon them by "We the people.

.

.

."

And, more basically, if the

Constitution suggests, as it most certainly has to most authorities, that
the founders wanted something less than pure and unlimited democracy,
it hardly behooves the Court under the guise of modesty to espouse an
unbridled democracy. 31 So finally, the modest cannot totally reject
review because of their democratic scruples. Nor can they, in view of
those scruples, rest content with judicial activism.3"
The proponents of review have made much of the historical acceptance
of that institution by the American people, and the modest would, I
think, be the last to deny the traditional role of review.3 3 But, as Judge
Hand's work clearly shows, they are troubled by the suspicion that the
popular purchase was the result of fraudulent advertising, and it is not
necessary to dredge up a theory of Marshallian usurpation to justify this
suspicion. If the people have been led by the Justices themselves, or
for that matter by Fourth of July oratory, into believing that the Supreme
Court merely puts the Constitution on top of the statute and lops off
whatever sticks out over the edges, they have accepted the form not the
substance of review. This is not to say that popular acceptance means
nothing, but only that it cannot mean too much. It can hardly soothe the
democratic conscience to employ a history of popular support in defending a policy-making function which the people never knew they were
giving away. Yet, the judge who feels that review has been unavoidably
thrust upon him by a long-continued error in popular understanding may,
like Judge Hand, seek to limit the error and point out the misunderstanding. Again, it is not that the modest abandon review; it is that they
cannot in good conscience fully accept it.
It is precisely this policy-making element in review that is the real
sticking point for most of the modest.
31 See Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis 292-93 (1956).
32 Witness Justice Frankfurter dissenting:
The reason why from the beginning even the narrow judicial authority to nullify
legislation has been viewed with a jealous eye is that it serves to prevent the full
play of the democratic process. The fact that it may be an undemocratic aspect of
our scheme of government does not call for its rejection or its disuse.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 650 (1943).
33 See e.g., Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
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Although it is all very well to say, as Professor Black does, that policy
preferences are an inevitable part of all legal decision-making, to the
modest, already uncertain as to the democratic authorization and constitutional legitimacy of review, this argument is less likely to be comforting
than to drive them completely from the field. Yet the Court does not, in
the light of history, feel justified in making such a retreat, and therefore
remains of necessity in the policy-making realm, while engaging in
34
endless self-flagellation for its unavoidable sin.
Thus, the modest find that the Constitution is law but not only or quite
law, that the intentions of the founders and subsequent history justify
review somewhat but not entirely, that the Court and review are neither
wholly compatible nor incompatible with majoritarian democracy, and
that judicial policy-making is an unavoidable but not completely laudable
element of constitutional adjudication. To all this Professor Black for
the activists replies that the Constitution is law, the Court is democratic,
review has the sanction of the founders and of history, and the Court
must make policy decisions. To the modest it can only seem that the
activists deal with the dilemma of review by firmly impaling themselves
on one of its horns.35
JUDICIAL MODESTY AND POLITICAL REALITY

If the hosts of the modest are to be delivered from their dilemma, some
role and rationale for the Supreme Court must be found which will
34 "Every justice has been accused of legislating and every one has joined in that
accusation of others." Supra note 22 at, 80. Perhaps the Justices can console themselves
with Professor Freund's aphorism: "If anything more is needed to assure a disinterested
judgment than a bias against bias, it is perhaps a bias against bias against bias." But
one suspects this is just a more elegant repetition of T.R. Powell's notion that the Court
would not invalidate a statute unless it were "too damned raw." And this leads directly
back to the personal prejudice which is the bete noir of the modest. The point is that
unless the policy-making function of the Court can be linked with some special justification for review, there is not much comfort in stressing the inescapability of personal judgment. A recognition of the inevitability of sin has not proved a particularly successful
means of tranquilizing the transgressors.
35 It is little wonder, then, that what we find among the modest is not a direct attack
on the proponents of review but a kind of intellectual schizophrenia. Judge Hand denies
that any specific provision of the Constitution, and most particularly the Bill of Rights,
justifies review and then drags it back in by a rule of statutory construction which is
admittedly a lawyer's artifice. Professor Thayer approves review by fashioning a rule of
administration which could be logically met by any statute passed by any but a totally
insane or guileless Congress. Justice Jackson attacks the cult of judicial activism while
writing the Second Flag Salute opinion. And Justice Frankfurter writes his dozens of "the
Constitution is important and the Court must protect it but . . ." opinions typified by the
Dennis concurrence, while dissenting alone in the Lincoln Mills case. And he tops it all
off with the following eulogy of John Marshall. "The courage of Marbury v. Madison
is not minimized by suggesting that its reasoning is not impeccable and its conclusion, however wise, not inevitable. I venture to say this though fully aware that, since Marshall's
time and largely, I suspect, through the momentum of the experience which he initiated,
his conclusion in Marbury v. Madison has been deemed . . . indispensable. . . ." Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 219.
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preserve review but limit it sufficiently, and give it the proper amount
of special justification to meet the qualms and suspicions which have
been aroused. More particularly, if the Court is to continue in the free
speech area, some formula must be derived that will ease the tension
between libertarianism and modesty which is so striking a characteristic
of the contemporary constitutional scene.
It might be argued that this approach takes for granted the desirability
of continued judicial action in the speech field. Indeed it does. But, who
does not consider such activity advisable? Walter Berns, in one of the
foremost attacks on libertarianism, 6 prefers virtue to freedom, but says
he wants both and favors review. Justice Frankfurter intervenes in the
case of academic freedom37 and, even while insisting that the First
Amendment is not absolute, holds in reserve the power of review 8
Professor Latham, who has vigorously represented that camp of the
modest which preaches that salvation must be found in the legislature,"
nevertheless concedes that the Court should keep trying.40 We are left
with Learned Hand, who has said the Bill of Rights was merely an
admonition to Congress. 4' However, even Judge Hand is obviously
caught between the advantages of review in the speech cases and his
general democratic objections to it. 42 His view of the Billr of Rights is

thus another sign of the modesty dilemma. After trying to strike a
balance, he simply chooses to impale himself on the opposite horn from
Professor Black.43 '
In short, everybody talks about free speech, but the modest don't
know what to do about it. The great irony of constitutional law today
is that the very group which is most concerned with the preservation of
freedom and the democratic process has thought itself into near paralysis.
The problem is to find some means of helping those who favor free speech
to overcome their qualms about exploiting judicial support.
The first step, it seems to me, is to reunite two bodies of data which
are separated with the most amazing perversity in the structure of
constitutional discussion. While the political role of the Supreme Court
is widely, albeit often shamefacedly, recognized, all real knowledge of
politics seem to disappear as soon as the discussion turns to constitutional
36 Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment (1957).
37 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255-56 (1951) (concurrence).

38 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-56 (1951) (concurrence).
39 See his "Supreme Court's Crusade For Freedom," 28 Commentary 108 (1959).
40 Latham, The Theory of the Judicial Concept of Freedom of Speech, 12 J. Politics
637, 650 (1950).
41 Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 696,
697 (1946) ; see also Daniel Reeves Inc. v. Anderson, 43 F.2d 679, 682 (1930).
42 Hand, The Bill of Rights 69, 71-73 (1958).
43 Id. at 73-74.
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law. It is not that many of the modest do not know better. Judge Hand
has spoken of the legislature as a vehicle for group struggle.44 Certainly,
Professor Latham is the last person who could be accused of political
naivete; 4' but, the former, nevertheless, insists on talking about the
democratic legislature and the undemocratic Court, and the latter contributes to the endless discussion of whether the Court has historically
thwarted the will of the majority without pointing out that nearly every
interest in society is a group and, therefore, a minority interest.4 6 Even
among the activists there is much talk about democracy and free government and majority rule without any awareness of the political complexities
47
which lie behind the tags.

We must take a closer look at the "democracy" with which the modest,
48
in revulsion to judicial activism, have armed the "political" branches.
It might be best to begin with the favorite son of the modest, Congress.
The major problem is, of course, that judges and others who should know
better keep talking about Congress as if it were a unified body. However, even when Woodrow Wilson wrote that "Congressional government
is committee government,"4 9 it could hardly have been news that Congress
rarely acts as a whole. Congressional policy is today largely made in the
crosscurrents of clashing committee jurisdictions.' Nor can this dominance be considered as simply a routine division of labor, for the
committees are not microcosms of the Congress as a whole. They have
distinct and separate characters to match their independent power. For
example, the seniority rule insures that chairmen will come from those
particular geographic areas where one party or the other is permanently
in the majority. More important, since committee assignment is now
largely a matter of personal preference, at least once a minimum of
seniority has accrued, many of the most important committees tend to
be packed by particular interests. Thus, the agriculture and interior
committees are comprised almost entirely of representatives from farm
constituencies and Westerners. This means that committees tend to
establish and maintain a point of view far different from Congress as a
whole, and these special viewpoints combined with the great power of
44
45

Op. cit. supra note 41 at 697.

See his The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-Point Legislation (1952);
The Politics of Railroad Coordination (1959).
46 Latham, "The Supreme Court and the Supreme People," 16 J. Politics 207 (1954).
47 See, e.g., Rostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial Review," 66 Harv. L. Rev.

193 (1952).
48 See Dietze, "America and Europe-Decline and Emergence of Judicial Review,"
44 Va. L. Rev. 1233, 1268 (1958).
49 Congressional Government (1956)

(preface to the original edition reprinted in the
Meridian edition).
50 See Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Policy (1958); Gross, The
Legislative Struggle (1953).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47

the committees turns Congress into a feudal domain with various special
interests glowering at each other from their own strongholds.
The party leaders are thus placed in something like the position of the
feudal monarch, but they rarely penetrate very deeply into the committees' business5 ' so that they tend to get problems which have already
been stamped with the views of the special jurisdictions. Nevertheless,
it is probable that committee chairmen and other representatives of
special groups can rarely hope to attain their legislative ends without
at least the passive approval and often the active intervention of the
leadership. 2 However, this leadership tends to act interstitially so that
its responsibility for any particular decision is difficult to trace. Moreover, it attains its position not by direct popular election, but by the
complex internal politics of the two Houses. Once established it can
normally maintain itself no matter what the state of public opinion. Here
again, it is not just the independent power and lack of responsibility to
the nation as a whole which puts the party leadership outside the
democratic clich6s; it is the mode of their accession to the throne, for
only those reach the top who have the staying power of a safe constituency. Therefore, when we look for the national leaders of Congress,
we are likely to find a Texas dynasty.
On this complex Congressional power structure is applied constituency
pressure. But what could be more democratic than representatives
heeding the view of their constituents? The difficulty is that because
Congressmen hold widely unequal positions of power which vary from
issue to issue, particular constituencies hold immensely disproportional
influences on certain questions. For example, the Georgia constituents of
Senator George and Representative Vinson must have been for some years
among the most powerful voters in the nation. Thus, the democratic
vision of equal voters exerting their influence through equal representatives is an illusion so far as Congress is concerned. It is equally illusory
when the voter's position vis-a-vis one another is considered. Malapportionment and gerrymandering seem a permanent feature of the
American electoral scheme. 53 Therefore, Congress, even without the
complex power structure which warps and twists the legislative process,
is undemocratically skewed even before it gets down to business.
One last horrible might be added to the parade, lobbying. The point
here is not that economic, social, and other groups seek to influence
legislators and occasionally use shady means; there is nothing un51 Supra note 50, at 261.
52 Truman, The Congressional Party 99-133, 245-47 (1959).
53 See Baker, Rural Versus Urban Political Power (1955).
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democratic about putting one's case to a legislator. What is instructive
for our purposes is that lobbyists tend to exercise their influence selectively. They concentrate on those Congressional fiefs and fief holders
who are either most powerful in the area of their interest or in some other
area which can be traded off at a profit to the special interest involved. 54
The lobbyist thus recognizes, and re-enforces by whatever influence he
wields, the fragmentation of Congress' power and the dominance of the
specialized committees.
Constituency pressure, lobbying, considerations of personal power and
the sincerely held sentiments of the legislators combine to establish what
are essentially clientele committees with vast powers over Congress as a
whole. Moreover, the positions of essentially irresponsible power to
which individual Congressmen accede under this system allow further
distortion of the democratic process, for they may exploit their strongholds in one field to gain concessions in another.
If we are to place the Court somewhere in the structure of American
government, we must also consider the Presidency and the executive
branch generally. At first glance, the President seems to fit the democratic myth. He is elected by and represents the people of the United
States, the majority that the judges are not supposed to thwart. But,
when we look at the nominating conventions which actually determine
who the people get to choose, we again find a complex structure of political powers and the occupation of key positions by individuals who
represent narrow interests rather than the people of the nation. The
convention has been vigorously defended as the necessary arena in which
various groups and interests can compromise their differences and carry
on the political process which might otherwise fly to pieces under the
pressure of American diversity.'- This defense is valuable in showing
that here again the process is meaningless in terms of the voice of the
people and majority rule. Because no majority is clearly evident, smoke
filled rooms are necessary.
Certainly the electoral college was not inspired by pure democratic
majoritarianism. Its existence tends to favor certain kinds of candidates
and emphasize the claims of certain constituencies, e.g., the key cities in
marginal states, and, conversely, to effectively disenfranchise many citizens, e.g., Southern Republicans. Therefore, certain groups gain tactical
advantage over others in still another complexity of government.
54 For examples of the selective efforts of lobbyists see Bailey, Congress Makes a Law
(1950); Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy (1957); Schattschneider, Politics,
Pressures and the Tariff (1935).
55 See Herring, Politics of Democracy 225-39 (1940).
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The Presidency itself, then, can hardly be understood in simplistic,
majoritarian terms. It does not even provide the comfort of direct responsibility to the people, the absence of which so often troubles the
Supreme Court. Not only is the President secure for four years-a time
period in which he could do immeasurably more damage to the nation
than could the Supreme Court in fifteen-but we have been recently reminded that in many instances he may also wield dictatorial powers.5 6
When we turn from the Presidency itself to the executive branch, even
less of the voice of the people comes through. Many of the great executive departments are, and were frankly intended to be, clientele agencies
representing not the majority of the nation but special interests.5 7 They
not only find themselves captured by special interests but fling themselves
willingly into the traps in order to gain the independent grass roots political support which makes their life vis-i-vis Congress and the other
departments so much easier. Where no special interest group exists, the
departments may feel compelled to create one as the Department of the
Army recently did in organizing the Association of the United States
Army to counter the power of the Navy League and Air Force Association.
It must be re-emphasized that it is these interest-wedded departments
and the independent regulatory commissions, whose tendencies to be
captured by the industries they regulate is notorious, 8 which are the major source of law today. They provide the bulk of legislative proposals
which get before Congress, and they create and administer much of the
vast system of administrative law, value of which allegedly lies in the
expertise, i.e., the specialized and interest-oriented activities, of the bureaucrats.
The parochialism of the executive branch naturally is not confined to
the department level. One of the most distinctive features of American
government is the close relations between bureaus and their equivalent
Congressional committees which one commentator has called government
by whirlpool.5 9 Since the bureau generally drafts initial legislation and
the committee has paramount powers over the bill once it reaches Congress, these alliances are of tremendous importance. They tend to protect subordinate, and frequently group-dominated, segments of govern56 See Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (1948).

57 See Fenno, The President's Cabinet 20-29 (1959).
58 It is interesting to note that seemingly the only solution to this capture problem is
for the regulating agency to go out and build an independent power base of its own by
recruiting other interest groups to support it. See Latham, Politics of Railroad Coordination 1933-1936 (1959).
59 Griffith, Congress, Its Contemporary Role 37 (1956).
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ment from whatever democratic and broadly popular control one might
expect from Congress as a whole and from the President.60
Both the clientele aspects of the departments and the phenomenon of
government by whirlpool lead to the same kind of selective lobbying in
the executive branch as in the legislature. Groups desiring particular
goals seek out those agencies which are best equipped and most willing
to help. In other words, executive policy is made not so much through
general debate over major premises by politically responsible officials as
by the interaction of interest groups and bureaucratic subdivisions.
Thus, what really emerges from an examination of Congress and the
Presidency is not a picture of democratic, majoritarian bodies, voicing
popular will and responsible to it, but an elaborate political structure in
which groups seek advantage through maneuvering among the various
power centers. The results are not the enunciation of the will of the
majority of the American people but compromises among competing interest groups. Professor Truman, in a widely known study of American
government, has characterized the system as one of "political interest
groups" with "shared attitudes toward what is needed . . .observable
as demands or claims upon other groups . . . through or upon . . .the
institutions of government," and "potential" or "unorganized" interest
groups representing widely held interests and expectations about the
"rules of the game." The political process then proceeds through the
"access" of organized interest groups to the various organs of government roughly within the boundaries set by the general values of society.61
However, these groups cannot be conceived as simply portions of the
population acting on the elected or appointed officials. Government agencies in order to further their programs, or the programs of the groups they
represent, themselves seek to create support among other governmental
and nongovernmental groups. In this process of building, rebuilding,
trading, and borrowing political strength, clear questions for majority
decision simply do not emerge.62
The decisive question then is not one of majority rule or democratic
legitimacy but of what role and relative weight the Supreme Court has
in the national government as it actually operates today. It has been a
curious feature of the debate over the Court that some of the modest
60 The most thorough documentation of such an alliance, that between the Corps of
Engineers and the Public Works Committees is.to be found in Maass, Muddy Waters
(1951).
61

Truman, The Governmental Process 33-34, 264-6 , 510-14 (1951).

The literature on

the group nature of politics is by now immense. See Gross, The Legislative Struggle (1953) ;
Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (Intro. 1950), and especially the works of Latham, supra
note 45.
62 See, e.g., "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
(Supp. 1950) whose blueprint for reform illustrates rather neatly what we don't have now.
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have been arguing that it is too strong to leave unrestrained 3 while others
have been warning that it is too weak to rely upon. Careful examinations
of the Court's actual accomplishments do not yield much support for the
hypothesis that review is an extremely strong power in our system of
government.6 4 Thus, if the Court is weak, why worry about whether it
exercises self-restraint or not? A helpless "undemocratic" body should
not bother the majoritarians very much. Friends of the Court may worry
that it will overestimate its strength and take on opponents too big for
it, but, in fact, the Court has not historically suffered emasculation. 5
Judge Hand contends that no court can save a people who have lost the
desire to defend their own liberties and none is needed to protect the
rights of those who feel responsible for their own defense.0 6 Professor
Freund has pointed out that this argument is based on the false dichotomy between a people lost beyond saving or secure beyond the need of
help. There are no such people. The question is not whether the courts
can do everything, or nothing. It is whether they can do something.6
In a broader sense the whole debate over strength and weakness is
based on an abstract evaluation of the Supreme Court that ignores political reality. Fear of the Court's strength and the accompanying plaints
about democracy seem to stem largely from a view of the Court as one
of three independent and equal branches. If the President and Congress
are elected and the Supreme Court is not, and all three have an equal
voice, then the Court must abdicate in the name of democracy. But, of
course, there are not three equal branches of government but many centers of decision-making.
Thus Judge Hand's plea for modesty seems to be derived from an overly formalistic approach to government. He fears that the defenders of
freedom will ignore Congress when hospitably received by the courts. If
the Supreme Court is not equal, neither is it separate. No one is confronted with the choice of the Court or Congress. There is no more reason to assume that a group interested in freedom of speech will, when
confronted by the whole panoply of government, stop with the Supreme
Court than that the railroads will stop with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Furthermore, if some groups are overly naive about politics,
the answer is to instruct them, not narrow the available avenues of approach.
03 See, e.g., Konefsky, Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis 287 (1956); Mendelson, Clear
and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 311, 318 (1952).
64 See Frank, "Review and Basic Liberties," and Hurst, "Review and the Distribution
of National Powers" in Supreme Court and Supreme Law (Cahn ed. 1954).
05 See Rostow, supra note 47, at 210-17.
66 Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 272 (1952).
67 Freund, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 552 (1951).
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Abstract calculations of the Court's democratic responsibility cannot
get us very far. Much of the current thinking about the Court has its
base in the New Deal experience, and the principal complaint arising out
of that experience was the alleged lack of democratic restraints on the
Court. The consequences of the New Deal fight tend of course to prove
just the reverse, but we need not stop there. The average post-Civil War
Justice has sat only thirteen and a half years. 8 Since a President has the
opportunity of appointing a new Justice on the average of every twentytwo months, it seems unlikely that the Court could hold out very long
against entrenched majority sentiment. 9 President Roosevelt's problem
was thus exceptional and the sudden and radical shift in the Court's position in 1937 simply represents a variation in the more gradual change
to be statistically anticipated. 0
With a bow to Mr. Dooley it should be said here that, even aside from
the high turnover of the Justices, the Court does follow the election returns at least in terms of broad responses to popular desires. 71 Paradoxically enough, the nonelective and formally nonpolitical character of the
Court accentuates its sensitivity to public opinion. We have noted that
other institutions of the central government tend to rest upon relatively
independent and cohesive clienteles. The Court does not have the opportunity to control continuously the kind of active bounty-creating programs which serve to develop grass roots support. Thus, without a
unified body of special supporters, the Court lacks an anchor against the
shifting winds of national political sentiment.
Several commentators have pointed out that the Court's duty to square
its decisions with reason and authority is the key to its accountability
and responsibility to the public.7 2 In other words, the Justices' work
might well be viewed as a continuous attempt to convince the public that
the Court's decisions are constitutionally legitimate. It may be naive to
believe that the Court can be wholly limited by a self-interpreted Constitution.73 However, it is certainly equally naive to believe that the Justices are totally unrestrained by provisions to which they must continuously and publicly pay homage. Also, when the Court decides a specific
case, its opinion is a specific document, and that document records the
position of nine specific men.7 4
Black, The People and the Court 180 (1960).
69 Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker," 6 J.Pub. Law 279, 284-86 (1957).
08

70 Id. at 285.

71 Swisher, The Supreme Court in Modem Role 179-80 (1958).
72 Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren 212 (1958); Curtis, Law as
Large as Life 99-100 (1959).
73 Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 761, 763-64 (1955).
74 If the complexities of Dixon-Yates are recalled or an attempt made to locate the
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The greatest restraint on the Court is of course the judicial process
itself. It has become a truism that case-by-case determination limits the
Court to occasional and fiegative intervention in the governmental process
and excludes many vital areas entirely.75 Even when the Court does
exercise review, it does so largely on the sufferance of Congress. The
amending process is always available and a determined Congress has
rarely found that it cannot, by deft and persistent redrafting, eventually
accomplish its end. Professor Peltason has concluded after an examination of the place of courts in the political process that "judicial interpretation of the Constitution is not necessarily any more final than interpretation of a statute." 76
If the problems of the Court's power and responsibility are not so
simple as they are sometimes made to appear, neither are its relations to
Congress. Since Judge Gibson's day7 7 the opponents of review have argued that Congress can make determinations of constitutionality as well
as the Court, but Judge Gibson's argument is an early specimen of the
formalistic approach which seems to plague examinations of review. The
decision-making process in Congress is so complex and fractionalized
that even if the members of Congress sincerely desired to make a final
and "official" determination of constitutionality, they would find it difficult to do so. Congressional statutes, as we have noted, are the product
of a series of marginal adjustments and compromises among various
semi-independent groups. It is nearly impossible to interject black and
white questions like constitutionality into the early stages of such a
process. Moreover, when the bargaining has been so nearly completed
that a bill reaches the final debate and voting stage, so many commitments have been made that the interjection of a constitutional issue
would not only be futile but in many instances appear to be a traitorous
repudiation of pre-established agreements. It is, therefore, highly probable that considerations of constitutionality could only take their place
among the multitude of other considerations which acquire various
weights at various stages of the negotiations depending on how important they appear to any given legislative power holder. This not only
means that constitutional questions would be given relatively little
exact who, where, or when of any given decision on weapons systems or foreign policy, or
for that matter rivers and harbors improvements, the point should be clear. Who is held
to a higher standard of democratic responsibility, the Supreme Court or the Chief of the
Fish and Wild Life Service preparing a program proposal which will pass through and
be altered by the Bureau of the Budget, two legislative committees, two appropriations
committees, a conference committee, and the President before the new fish hatchery gets
built.
75 See Rostow, supra note 47, at 197-98.
76 Peltason, Federal Courts In The Political Process (1955).
77 See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawl. 330 (Pa. 1825).
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weight but that, on the few occasions they were decisive, the constitutional decision might well be made by something less than the whole Congress. If some people find it undemocratic and irresponsible to allow the
Supreme Court to decide constitutional questions, I fail to see how their
desires will be satisfied by transferring that function to the Chairman of
the Committee on Small Business or the Minority Whip.
Now the above discussion has even assumed, in order to make the inherent problems of the legislative process clearer, that something called
a constitutional issue can clearly and independently exist. However, the
modest have taught us that questions of policy inevitably are intermingled with questions of constitutionality. Therefore, even when a
Congressman has sincere constitutional misgivings, his complaints are
likely to appear to his colleagues as simply part of the rhetoric of political debate, a holier than thou mode of pushing his policy preferences.
Furthermore, it is hard to resist the temptation of suggesting, in spite
of the paucity of evidence, that nine times out of ten his colleagues will
be right. In any event, the policy content of constitutional questions
must inevitably tend to push them back into the mainstream of the legislative process. Therefore, it may be concluded that the nature of the
legislative process, combined with the nature of constitutional issues,
makes it virtually impossible for Congress to make independent, unified,
78
or responsible judgments on the constitutionality of its own statutes.
Furthermore, developments since Judge Gibson's day have made his
position totally untenable in terms of the real operation of our government. The most important of these has been the work of the modest
themselves. They have evolved a large body of doctrine, such as the rule
of reasonableness, to be applied to calculations of constitutionality.
These formulas implicitly, and often explicitly, rest on the fact that it is
the Court, not Congress, which has been doing the calculating. However, they have become so much a part of American lore that they now
seem to adhere to the process of constitutional determination itself. Even
if Congress took over most or all of the responsibility for formal constitutional review, we would undoubtedly find that debates on constitutionality
would ring with citations of Thayer and Holmes proving that a bill was
not unconstitutional unless no reasonable man could find it otherwise.
The result, given the pressures of politics, would probably be that Congress would bind itself with the very chains which the modest forged for
the Court, and the Constitution would indeed become simply a pious hope.
78 Professor Donald Morgan of Mt. Holyoke College is now gathering materials for a
forthcoming study of congressional treatment of constitutional issues which may allow
more definite conclusions on this subject.
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We cannot, after all, make arrangements de novo. The Congress has
traditionally decided on the merits and left the final constitutional issues
to the Court. It has for a very long time enjoyed the relative freedom of
decision-making which comes with such a shift of final responsibility. 9
There is no reason to believe that Congress will give up the freedom just
because the court divests itself of the responsibility, particularly if Jutices' resignation is accomplished not by a formal transfer of authority
but a series of modest proposals in judicial opinions which Congress is
free to ignore. 0 Reviewing both the historic role of Congress and its
actual mode of operation, it seems impossible to transfer to it a constitutional task which it has not, cannot, and will not undertake.
Thus abstract arguments about the power of the Court and the constitutional duty of Congress simply becloud the picture because they
fail to place the Court in its actual political environment. Since it operates as an institution within the complex of institutions which make up
the central government, we might expect that the Court would in fact be
similar to other such institutions. There have recently been several discussions of the Court's role in the political process. Professor Dahl, for
instance, finds that the Court is usually a part of the general political
alliance, that is, the relatively long-term coalition of cooperating interests
which dominates the government at any given time. Therefore, it cannot
normally expect to oppose the alliance on major issues with any hope of
permanent success. But, as one of the affiliated power groups, it can influence subordinate decisions within the established general policy orientation. The Court can only hope to intervene successfully on major
questions when the alliance is unstable on a key issue and if the Court's
actions represent a
widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by the political leadership;
norms which are not strong enough or are not distributed in such a way as
to insure the existence of an effective lawmaking majority but are, nonetheless, sufficiently powerful to prevent any successful attack on the legitimacy powers of the Court.81
In the simplest terms, the Court is least likely to block a real legislative
majority on a major issue and most likely to succeed against a fragile or
transient majority, or on a minor issue.82
79 Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 28-29
(1947); Freund, On Understanding the
Supreme Court 116 (1949).
80 The result is what one commentator called the "circular pass" in which Congress
throws the constitutional issues to the Court and the Court laterals them back to the
Congress, and the result of this game might be the disappearance of that constitutional
awareness in American political life which judicial review has done so much to create
and constantly re-enforce. Frank, supra note 64, at 134; Rostow, supra note 47, at 208.
81 Dahl, supra note 69, at 294.
82 Id. at 283-86, 293-94; See also Dietze, supra note 48, at 30.

1962]

JUDICIAL MODESTY

Professor Latham, in a historical survey, has found that the Court has
traditionally aided minority groups-the Federalists, the defeated states
after the Civil War, big business, and the judges themselves. He concludes that the Court "has been in a strategic position to cast its weight
this way and that when the balance could be tipped." 3 Of course, the
value of judicial review to minorities is widely attested.84
Finally, it has become practically a truism that one of the Court's principal functions is to act as the "conscience of the American people" 85 and
make audible the ideals which might otherwise remain submerged.8"
It is evident then that the Court, like other participants in the policymaking process, does in fact generally make only marginal contributions.
The degree of its influence on any given matter depends on the constellatio of other forces acting on that issue. Indeed, the similarity of its
problems and techniques to those of other agencies is striking. Over a
large range of its activities it is bound closely by statutory authorization
and finds its discretion largely in interpretation. Even in its narrow
area of policy initiation, the Court can be largely checked by the later
actions of Congress. The problem of "access," which Professor Truman
finds crucial to group relations with all governmental agencies, takes up
a large part of the Court's time, and its discretionary certiorari powers
allow the Court to take as much tactical advantage from this problem
as do the legislative committees of Congress. Like the committees, the
Court's expertise within its specialized field can be used to influence
other segments of government. To be sure, it lacks some of the opportunity which other agencies have of direct access to its fellows, but it
compensates for this through its greater access to the public and particularly to the legal profession which carries its messages swiftly to the
governmental bodies it wishes to reach.
Furthermore, the Court does seem to represent certain groups, in
other words, to have a clientele. Dahl and Latham agree that the Court
may be viewed as defending groups or "minorities.11 7 But, precisely
what groups make up the clientele of the Court, that is, what interests
find that the Court can provide them with influence and services which
they cannot find in as great a measure elsewhere in the government?
83 Latham, "The Supreme Court as a Political Institution," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 205, 227-28

(1947).

84 See, e.g., Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 79,
Dietze, supra note 48.
85 See Roche, supra note 73, at 771.
86 See, e.g., Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 197 (1947); Konefsky, Legacy of Holmes

and Brandeis 295 (1956); Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren 213 (1958).
87 If the central government is conceived as a system of groups, then most groups are,
almost by definition, minorities, and the terms group and minority may be used interchangeably.
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Here we must return briefly to Professor Truman's concept of "potential" or "unorganized" groups. Groups by definition are based on a
shared value. Some of these groups are organized, with a high degree of
interaction among their members, formal instrumentalities, et cetera.
Others, although based on a relatively specific and strongly held value,
are for various reasons not organized. A particularly significant variety
of unorganized groups is that based on a widely shared interest or expectation about the rules of the game which has been described in terms of
"systems of belief," "general ideological consensus," or a "broad body
of attitudes and understandings regarding the nature and limits of authority." These interests may be loose and ambiguous. Nevertheless,
sufficient disturbance to them will call forth political action and, more
immediately, the expectation that those government functionaries who
are violating the rules will be restrained by other agents of government. 8
It seems to be precisely these potential groups which Dahl is talking
about when he says that the Court may only intervene on major issues
in behalf of widely held but politically unfocused norms. The notion of
the Court as the conscience of the community also makes sense in this
light. It is true that Latham tends to see special-interest minority groups
as the Court's clientele, but Professor Peltason finds that it is not the
specific nature of these minorities but their general interest in obtaining
representation denied them by the legislature which turns them toward
the courts."'
Therefore, the Court like other governmental agencies does have a
clientele, consisting of precisely those interests which find themselves
unable to obtain representation from other agencies. There are of course
various reasons for this inability. "Potential" interest groups generally
lack the impetus for organization because the values they espouse are too
amorphous to promote a high rate of personal interaction. Thus, a group
built on the value of a tuna fish tariff is likely to enlist a higher degree of
immediate political activity than one proclaiming the desirability of fair
trial. The tuna fish group is, therefore, much more likely to have available to it the financial and personal resources necessary to gain successful access to a Congressional committee or executive bureau than is the
fair trial group.
The Supreme Court is peculiarly fitted to represent these potential
groups. Of course, if the value is completely amorphous, the courts can
be of no help. But, in a complex society such as ours, there will almost
always be some marginal-organized group-the American Civil Liber88 Truman, The Governmental Process, 511-14 (1951).
89 Peltason, Federal Courts in the Political Process 11 (1955).
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ties Union, the Jehovah's Witnesses, et cetera-to champion actively any
widespread social sentiment if only as an incident to its main purpose.
Such groups, however, are not likely to have much success with Congress
or the Executive, either because the constituencies they represent are too
unfocused to swing much political weight, or because their main lines of
activity make them politically unpopular.
Here, the modests' dilemma of a Court which is both political and
nonpolitical ceases to be a dilemma and becomes a unique contribution
to American government. The Court's proceedings are judicial, that is,
they involve adversary proceedings between two parties viewed as equal
individuals. Therefore, marginal groups can expect a much more favorable hearing from the Court than from bodies which, quite correctly,
look beyond the individual to the political strength he can bring into the
arena. The Court's powers are essentially political. Therefore, marginal
groups can expect of the Court the political support which they cannot
find elsewhere. Thus, through a judicial-political court, the potential interest group, via the marginal group, can achieve the political representation which makes a practical reality out of the value it espouses.
Highly organized groups may also turn to the Court, not because they
are unsuited to gain access to other agencies, but because, having gained
access along with other groups, they lost the political battle. If the
Court is to make its maximum contribution to the governing process, it
should probably devote its major energies to those groups which have no
other access to government. It need not act as the last resort of forum
shoppers who have been defeated elsewhere. In fact, just this emphasis
would seem to accord with the actual power situation. For the Court
can at most offer only minor advantages to organized interest groups
which have already failed in their more proper sphere. If the Hughes'
Court is to be criticized, it is on exactly these grounds. It attempted to
make a major intervention against the governing alliance in favor of an
organized pressure group which had been defeated in its own customary
arena precisely because it was acting contrary to widely held popular
sentiment.
However, even the comparative abilities of different potential interest
groups in capturing Congressional or executive support may vary widely.
Certain broad values are likely to be overrepresented and others underrepresented in the legislative and administrative processes. Congressmen
and bureaucrats, whose everyday concerns are likely to be highly attuned
to the welfare and security values which are at the heart of most governmental programs, naturally tend to be most responsive to those general
values.- The immediate problems and the need to provide positive govern-
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mental programs to solve them inevitably tend to outweigh long range
values such as individual freedom. The potential groups oriented to more
national security or more public welfare are likely to find sufficient satisfaction in Congress and the Executive without help from the Court.
Here again, the Court exhibits the characteristics of other agencies of
government. It is subject to lobbying by a wide range of groups, some
of whom find it an essential, others merely a supplementary, source of
representation. It will, on occasion, give marginal assistance to nearly
any interest, but if it wishes to act effectively in the long run, the Court
must reserve its major effort for its particular clientele.
If the Court is similar to other clientele agencies, we would expect it
to create and reinforce its own supporting interests. Here, the widely
held notion that the Court acts as an educator, particularly in the civil
rights field,9" begins to make sense in a political context. Professor
Swisher notes that the Court's power "depends on its ability to articulate
deep convictions on the .part of the people in such a way that the people
who might not have been able to articulate them themselves will recognize the judicial statement as essentially their own."'" In other words,
the Court's opinions must be designed to bring widespread sentiments or,
as we have put it, certain of the potential groups in society, to the fore.
And from this strengthened position, these groups support the Court.
Moreover, other agencies have learned that they must not only support the values of their supporters but tout the particular ability of the
agency to serve those values. These two factors become inextricably
mixed in agency enunciations so that it becomes impossible, for instance,
to separate the desirability of flood control from the necessity of an
active Corps of Engineers, and this is a politically if not logically sound
mixture. The strength of the agency, or at least some agency, is essential
to the satisfaction of the group interest.
Judicial modesty poses a particular threat to this process of interacting support between agency and clientele. For the more the Court announces its impotence, the less group support it receives and the more
impotent it becomes. Conversely, the less agency protection the group
interest receives, the less capable it becomes of politically meaningful
action. Thus, modest professions of lack of judicial power ignore the
real world in which political power comes to those who seek and construct it. We have long since tired of Presidents who proclaim a program
but refuse to engage in the cultivation of political support which can
90 See, e.g., Brogan, Politics in America 355-56 (Anchor ed. 1960); Mason, supra note
86, at 213; Freund, supra note 67, at 552.
9' Swisher, The Supreme Court in Modem Role 179-80 (1959).
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make that program a reality. It is time we lost patience with the Justice
who proclaims his faith in the values of freedom but cannot bring himself
to face the political realm in which those values must be protected.
There is something to the argument that the Court must profess some
limitations for fear that intervening always and everywhere will result
in dribbling away its power.9 2 In so far as this view means that the
Court should not exert itself excessively in the interest of groups on the
margins or outside its clientele, it represents sound political .counsel.
However, it must be borne firmly in mind that the building of a clientele
is a continous process. The Justice who retreats case after case, husbanding his strength for the really big one, may find when the time comes that
he has retreated right off the battlefield, for the Court like other political
instrumentalities cannot expect to retain its strength without the constant and routine recruiting of support which other politicians call fencemending. The Court has only one means of mending its fences, the opinions it issues. If these opinions do not continuously demonstrate the
Court's willingness to act in favor of its supporters, it cannot expect to
find much support left when it finally does act.
A similar difficulty arises when the Court uses procedural or technical
devices to protect rights rather than making a broad constitutional attack. 93 If all constitutional questions are translated into technical questions of interpretation and procedure, the popular reaction is likely to
be that constitutional law must be left to the technicians, that is the
lawyers. Narrowly legal opinions are likely to interfere with the Court's
ability to enlist outside support and thus with its long term capacity to
act successfully.
The concern of the judicially modest has been to differentiate what
the Supreme Court might properly do from the legitimate functions of
other branches of government. Their difficulty, it seems to me, is that
the differentiation has been based on an abstract and artificial view of
the American governing process. The Court must indeed attempt to
perform its own not some other institution's tasks. But, what is and is
not its own must be determined in the light of actual political arrangements. In that light, the Court can best define its special function as the
representation of potential or unorganized interests or values which are
unlikely to be represented elsewhere in government.
This approach should release the modest from the dilemma which has
Curtis, Law as Large as Life 100-02 (1959).
See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S.
536 (1956); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
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led to their hesitancies about judicial activity. Whether the Constitution
is or is not law is not so important when judicial review rests not on the
equation of law and Constitution but on the role of the Court as one
clientele agency among many. That review has, and perhaps has not,
been historically accepted is less significant than the historical acceptance
of a system of national government in which power is fragmented among
many agencies including the Court. That the Court is democratic but
not entirely so is largely meaningless in a system of government in
which there are many power holding institutions each varying somewhat
from the others in the degree of democracy used in their selection and in
the directness of their responsibility to the people. That the Court deals
with law but also with policy is hardly a critical point in a situation where
the judicial, administrative, and legislative processes are carried on
simultaneously within many of the agencies of government.
In short, the problems of the modest are not so much a dilemma as a
set of outer limits within which all American government, not just the
Supreme Court, operates. Therefore, that dilemma need not paralyze
the Court any more than it paralyzes the rest of the government.
PREFERRED POSITION AND THE POLITICAL

ROLE

OF THE COURTS

More specifically, the dilemma need not prevent those interested in
freedom of speech from using the Court just as they would any other
government agency particularly when it is one of the means best suited
to their purpose. There is no reason why one interest group should deny
itself the advantages offered it by a political system which is fully exploited by all other interest groups. A realistic assessment of American
government leads to the conclusion that neither the defenders of free
speech nor the Supreme Court should have any qualms about undertaking
as much activity as the current constellation of political forces allow
them.
It is in this light that the balancing-of-interests formula which has
been vigorously urged as a replacement for the traditional approach to
speech regulation must be examined. This formula requires that the
Court survey all the clashing interests involved in a given infringement
on speech and decide on the basis of whether the interests protected by
the infringement outweigh the interests in the speech. The technique is
subject to two major objections. In so far as it is derived from judicial
reluctance actively to protect speech,94 balancing is based on a mistaken
94 See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 (1958) (Frankfurter concurring);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 494 (1951) and Frankfurter's concurrence in that
case at 524-25 and 542; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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concept of modesty. By diluting the strength of judicial activity represented by the clear and present danger rule, the balancing formula takes
the Court out of precisely that area in which it is particularly suited to
operate, the protection of potential interest groups and, more specifically,
the potential group clustered around the free speech values.
The second objection to balancing is that it not only moves the Court
out of an area in which it is especially competent, but into one where the
burden on the judges is much too heavy. The balancing and accommodation of group interests is the task of the whole system of American government, not the Supreme Court alone. If the Court attempts a complete and impartial balancing of all claims, it is likely to underrepresent
its own clientele. While the Court remains within a political process
where all other agencies push particular claims, such under representation means that the final product of the political calculus will be especially
unfavorable to the groups depending on the judiciary. In other words,
too much balancing by the Supreme Court is likely to upset the balance
of the political process as a whole.
A politically realistic approach also does much to clear up the difficulties over the preferred position doctrine without retreating to a balancing
standard. This doctrine simply requires that the normal presumption of
constitutionality need not be entertained when legislation curbs political
liberties, particularly those of minority groups.9 5 The employment of
this technique as a protection for minority groups disturbed majoritarians
because, in the abstract, it seemed to imply minorities using the Court
to thwart majority will. Once the doctrine is placed within the context of
the group nature of politics, it becomes evident that the Court acts not for
a minority against a majority, but for one group against other groups.
Indeed, if the Court tends to defend potential groups against organized
groups, it is protecting the broader interests.
Similarly, the notion that the preferred position doctrine serves to
withdraw some issues from the democratic process has frequently proved
unpalatable. It requires the proponents of preferred position to argue at
one and the same time that the Justices must protect the democratic
95 The doctrine was largely the work of Justice Stone, who suggested it in his Cardene
Products decision (See note 96 infra) and who first used the actual words in Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942) (dissent). See Mason, The Core of Free Government,
1938-40; "Mr. Justice Stone and 'Preferred Freedoms,'" 65 Yale L.J. 597 (1956). The
doctrine was used in majority opinions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
and West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The strongest statement of preferred position is that by Justice Rutledge in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945). The doctrine is also to be found in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575
(1944). See also the compilation of cases in the concurrence of Justice Frankfurter in
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-94 and the comment by Justice Rutledge at 106.
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process and that they must not allow all decisions to be made by it.
Confusion is, therefore, inevitable when the democratic process yields a
limitation on the democratic process as it does, for instance, when legislation restricting speech is passed. However, the difficulty largely disappears, I think, when attacked in the political terms used here. In the
actual political process some groups seek to limit speech and use certain
agencies of government to reach their goal. Other groups seek to protect
speech and use other government agencies for their purposes. The political process is continuous so that a victory by the former groups, in
the legislature, for instance, simply calls forth renewed efforts by the
latter groups and vice versa. When the Court strikes down a law limiting speech, it is not obstructing democracy in the name of preserving the
democratic process. It is participating in that process, as it exists in the
United States, by representing groups which are not sufficiently represented elsewhere. Furthermore, the Court's action is not final. It is
simply another event thrown into the continually turning political hopper.
The larger problem of whether the preservation of the free market
place of political activity will in the long run yield freedom or slavery is
more serious, but its importance to the Court has been overinflated by
considering the Court as a separate entity. The Justices are, after all,
neither Plato's Legislators nor his Guardians. They are a part, not the
whole, of the political process. As such they cannot make the cosmic
decisions nor enforce them if they do. Thus, the Court cannot institute
either a wholly free or a wholly controlled market. The evolution of the
intellectual economy is determined by the political process as a whole.
The Court can content itself with making its contribution to the freedom
of that process and, considering the strength of the restrictive forces at
work, it need hardly fear that its influence will yield a liberty so extreme
that it turns to chaos. For the same reason, the arguments that the first
amendment should not be preferred to other constitutional provisions is
not very helpful. The preferred position doctrine need not be understood
as a universal ranking of values. It is a statement about what interest the
Court should represent given the contemporary political circumstances.
Preferred position then refers not to the special importance of certain
values to society as a whole but to the representational role of the Court.
It should be remembered that the original formulation of the doctrine in
Stone's Carolene Products footnote 6 offered just this emphasis on preferred position in terms of the Court's functions. The footnote has been
criticized for inconsistency,9" but it seems to make quite good sense in
96 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
97 See Braden, "The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 Yale L.J. 571,
580 (1948).
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terms of politics if not logic. One paragraph stressed the need to protect
minorities, which usually turn out to be the marginal groups representing
potential groups. Another notes the special role of the Court in keeping
open the democratic process. The specific wording of the first amendment is the main point of the third. What this all comes down to is that
the Court, because of its special position and special constitutional authorization, is an instrument of government particularly suited to represent the claims of those groups interested in free speech.
All this does not mean that the aura of special importance which surrounds the preferred position doctrine is an unjustified inflation of a
routine political function, for the Court does, after all, have a rather
special clientele and a rather special role. Professor Truman notes that
the ability of potential groups to contribute to the political process is
largely determined by "the character of the society's means of communication, . . . the adequacy of the information available to them con-

cerning the events. ' 8 Therefore, the Court's concern with free speech,
expressed in the preferred position doctrine, not only furthers the interests of the potential group clustered about that value but provides the
necessary foundation for the effectiveness of all such groups. The Court's
special preoccupation with the continuity and long range evolution of constitutional development, combined with its real political power, make it a
peculiarly suitable instrument for interests lacking immediate power, but
vitally concerned with the general evolution of American government.
Here again, the modests' dilemma of a Court which is in day to day
politics, but not wholly so, proves to be a peculiarly helpful feature of
American government.
CONCLUSION

Indeed, once the multiple dilemmas of the modest have been dissolved
by the application of a little political realism, there seems to be no particular reason why they should not accept the pieferred position doctrine.
It still retains some foothold on the CourtY9 Judge Hand finally came
very close to accepting it."° In fact, it seemed implicit in some of his
earlier writing, for he had based his faith on a legislature which expressed
the common will and then defined the common will in terms of the availability of political means for peaceful change." 1 The seeds of the doctrine may even be found in Thayer who criticizes judicial law-making
98 The Governmental Process 517 (1951).
99 Mason & Beaney, The Supreme Court in a Free Society 301 (1959); Miller, "Introduction to a Symposium," 6 J. Pub. Law 275, 278 (1957).
100 Hand, The Bill of Rights 69 (1958).
101 Frank, "Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand," 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 700

(1957).
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precisely because it prevented free discussion."0 2 Both Hand and Thayer
are, then, concerned with the maintenance of free access to the instrumentalities of political power and this is the heart of the preferred position
doctrine. Professor Freund, who is in good standing with those who oppose "rigid" formulas, has proposed something very like preferred position.'0 3 The wording of the first amendment and the continued acceptance of the political philosophy it represents must provide some comfort
for those of the modest who have objected to the importation of outdated
economic philosophies into vague constitutional provisions., 4 The Court
has recently been willing to use even less precise constitutional language
as the basis for a finding of unconstitutionality.0 5
The preferred position doctrine is an adequate description of the actual
role of Supreme Court. It has the added advantage of providing the
Court with a rhetoric of minority rights, democracy, and constitutionalism which can serve as an efficient weapon in recruiting and protecting
a clientele. And this rhetoric undoubtedly does represent a fundamental
set of American beliefs which are entitled to constitutional protection.
The preferred position doctrine allows the Court to act politically while
preserving what now remains of the judicial myth and to direct its political activity in the interests of groups which desperately need a source
of support in the national government.
It may strike the reader that I have abandoned here one of the principal arguments which has led to continued support of preferred position,
the vision of a Court above and beyond the political process and able to
protect it impartially. It seems to me this approach raises more problems
than it solves. If the Court is outside the process, then it is undemocratic. If it is outside the process, chances are it lacks the
power to do the job. If it is supposed to be outside the process, then
it should not make policy decisions. In short, the whole modesty dilemma. Instead, the Court is inside the political process. We have no
Olympian judiciary. If it is to do anything, it must do where the doing
gets done, in the give and take of politics. It is in this sense that the
modest are right. The corrective for abuses of the democratic process
must be found within that process. That is why the Court must fulfill its
role by acting politically within the democratic process as we know it in
the United States.
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